Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights

We study the determinants of patent suits and their outcomes over the period 1978-1999 by linking detailed information from the U.S. patent office, the federal court system, and industry sources. The probability of being involved in a suit is very heterogeneous, being much higher for valuable patents and for patents owned by individuals and smaller firms. Thus the patent system generates incentives, net of expected enforcement costs, that differ across inventors. Patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trade, or having other characteristics that encourage 'cooperative' interaction with disputants, more successfully avoid court actions. At the same time, key post-suit outcomes do not depend on observed characteristics. This is good news: advantages in settlement are exercised quickly, before extensive legal proceedings consume both court and firm resources. But it is bad news in that the more frequent involvement of smaller patentees in court actions is not offset by a more rapid resolution of their suits. However, our estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can facilitate development of private patent litigation insurance to mitigate this adverse affect of high enforcement costs.

Combining census and survey data to study spatial dimensions of poverty

Poverty maps, providing information on the spatial distribution of living standards, are an important tool for policy making and economic research. Policymakers can use such maps to allocate transfers and inform policy design. The maps can also be used to investigate the relationship between growth and distribution inside a country, thereby complementing research using cross-county regressions. The development of detailed poverty maps is difficult because of data constraints. Household surveys contain data on income or consumption but are typically small. Census data cover a large sample but do not generally contain the right information. Poverty maps based on census data but constructed in an ad-hoc manner can be unreliable. The authors demonstrate how sample survey data and census data can be combined to yield predicted poverty rates for all households covered by the census. This represents an improvement over ad hoc poverty maps. However, standard errors on the estimated poverty rates are not negligible, so additional efforts to cross-check results are warranted.Health Economics&Finance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Services&Transfers to Poor,Poverty Monitoring&Analysis,Public Health Promotion,Poverty Monitoring&Analysis,Health Economics&Finance,Poverty Assessment,Environmental Economics&Policies,VN-Acb Mis -- IFC-00535908

Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights

We study the determinants of patent suits and their outcomes over the period 1978-1999 by linking detailed information from the U.S. patent office, the federal court system, and industry sources. The probability of being involved in a suit is heterogeneous, being much higher for valuable patents and for patents owned by individuals and smaller firms. Thus the patent system generates incentives, net of expected enforcement costs, that differ across inventors. Patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trade, or having other characteristics that encourage "cooperative" interaction with disputants, more successfully avoid court actions. At the same time, key post-suit outcomes do not depend on observed characteristics. This is good news: advantages in settlement are exercised quickly, before extensive legal proceedings consume both court and firm resources. But it is bad news in that the more frequent involvement of smaller patentees in court actions is not offset by a more rapid resolution of their suits. However, our estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can facilitate development of private patent litigation to mitigate this adverse effect of high enforcement costs.Parents, court actions, settement.

Stylised Fact of Patent Litigation: Value, Scope and Ownership

This paper investigates the characteristics of litigated patents by combining for the first time information about patent case filings from the U.S. district courts and detailed data from the U.S. Patents and Trademark Office. A series of indicators is constructed for the factors which the theoretical literature suggests contribute to litigation: the frequency of disputes, the size and asymmetry of stakes, the structure of information, and costs. Compared to a random sample of U.S. patents from the same cohorts and technology areas, it is found that more valuable patents and those with domestic owners are considerably more likely to be involved in litigation. Patents owned by individuals are at least as likely to be the subject of a case as corporate patents, and litigation is frequently in new technology areas. The results are interpreted with reference to theoretical models of litigation and settlement and the effects of patent litigation on the incentive to invest in R&D is discussed.Patents, litigation, R&D.

Economic Consequences of a Changing Litigation Environment: The Case of Patents

A model of patent infringement is developed to analyze the relationship between litigation and aspects of the legal environment such as the probability that the patent is found valid, the size of legal fees and their allocation across agents. Potential challengers first decide whether to infringe and then the patentee decides whether or not to prosecute. The outcome of this game has a fundamental impact on the value of patent protection to a patentee. This model is then linked to a patent renewal model which explicitly incorporates the legal parameters of interest from the litigation game. Estimates of the renewal model allow the empirical estimation of the private value of a patent protection. Simulations are presented for Germany which show the quantitative impact of changes in the legal environment on the value generated by the patent system and hence the incentives created for innovation.

Enforcing intellectual property rights

We study the determinants of patent suits and their outcomes over the period 1978- 1999 by linking detailed information from the U.S. patent office, the federal court system, and industry sources. The probability of being involved in a suit is heterogeneous, being much higher for valuable patents and for patents owned by individuals and smaller firms. Thus the patent system generates incentives, net of expected enforcement costs, that differ across inventors. Patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trade, or having other characteristics that encourage “cooperative” interaction with disputants, more successfully avoid court actions. At the same time, key post-suit outcomes do not depend on observed characteristics. This is good news: advantages in settlement are exercised quickly, before extensive legal proceedings consume both court and firm resources. But it is bad news in that the more frequent involvement of smaller patentees in court actions is not offset by a more rapid resolution of their suits. However, our estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can facilitate development of private patent litigation to mitigate this adverse effect of high enforcement cost

Under threat: potential competition, litigation and the private value of patent protection

This paper investigates the effect of the threat and occurrence of patent litigation on the private value of patent protection. Potential challenges are introduced into a renewal model as a factor in patentee decisions as to whether a patent is worth maintaining. The model yields testable predictions about renewal probabilities. Data for post WWII German patents support the hypothesis that the need to defend patent rights influences patentee behaviour. The paper concludes with a discussion of how this factor may be incorporated in patent value estimations and what the results imply for the interpretation of patent data

Stylised fact of patent litigation: value, scope and ownership

This paper investigates the characteristics of litigated patents by combining for the first time information about patent case filings from the U.S. district courts and detailed data from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. We construct a series of indicators for the factors which the theoretical literature suggests contribute to litigation: frequency of disputes, the size and asymmetry of stakes, the structure of information, and costs. Compared to a random sample of U.S. patents from the same cohorts and technology areas, we find that more valuable patents and those with domestic owners are considerably more likely to be involved in litigation. Patents owned by individuals are at least as likely to be the subject of a case as corporate patents and litigation is particularly frequent in new technology areas. We interpret the results with reference to theoretical models of litigation and settlement and discuss what they suggest about the effect of patent litigation on the incentives to invest in R&D

How to Compare Apples and Oranges: Poverty Measurement Based on Different Definitions of Consumption.

Poverty rates calculated on the basis of household consumption expenditures are routinely compared across countries and time. The surveys which underlie these comparisons typically differ in the types of food and non-food expenditures included, often in ways which are easily overlooked by analysts. With several examples we demonstrate that these commonly occurring variations in expenditure definitions can give rise to marked differences in poverty rates where there are no real differences in well-being. We show that one approach to calculating poverty lines, used with the headcount measure of poverty, can allow comparisons based on data with different definitions of consumption. In addition to allowing comparative poverty analysis using existing survey data, the results suggest that poverty monitoring could be done effectively at lower cost by alternating detailed expenditure surveys with far more abbreviated surveys. Copyright 2001 by The International Association for Research in Income and Wealth.